Getting Old With Anti-Zionist Ignorance- A Response to Jason Kishineff
Jason Kishineff is a supposedly an “anti-imperialist” “anti-war” activist who probably grew up on some history books on an elementary level and thinks that because he read some of the writings of the “historian” who self-admitting cut off all contact with reality — Ilan Pappé (“I admit that my ideology influences my historical writings”) a friend of Holocaust deniers — Norman Finkelstein (David Irving is “very good historian”) and a supposedly ex- “9/11 truther” Russian-Venezuela state-sponsored Abby Martin somehow means he can enlighten us all about the conflict.
And that’s what he’s trying to do in his article “Growing Up With Zionist Propaganda”
“He ( Yitzak Rabin) led the Lydda Death March, in 1948, expelling (ethnically cleaning) tens of thousands of Palestinians. In Lydda (now known as Lod), specifically, the Palestinians that lived there had hidden the Jewish paramilitary from the imperial British soldiers, whom they had been attacking. Those same paramilitary turned on their Arab protectors less than a year later and murdered them.”
On December 14, 1947, three Jews were burned alive by an Arab mob in Lydda.
Hasan Salameh, the Nazi trained commander of the Palestinian Holy War Army, used Lydda as a military base to attack Jewish convoys between Tel Aviv and the Jewish towns in the area.
By the time of the Israeli attack on the evening of 11 July, 300–400 Israeli soldiers entered the town, the militia in Lydda numbered 1,000 men equipped with rifles, submachine guns, 15 machine guns, five heavy machine guns, 25 anti-tank launchers, six or seven light field-guns, two or three heavy ones, and armoured cars with machine guns. The IDF estimated that there was an Arab Legion force of around 200–300 men. Lydda contained several hundred Bedouin volunteers and a large-sized force of the Arab Legion. 
Though outnumbered by the town’s defenders, Dayan and his men used speed and surprise to subdue the town, which surrendered.
The overall commander of the operation in Lydda, Moshe Kelman, met with the town’s leaders to discuss surrender terms, beginning with Simon Garfeh, the Greek Orthodox Archimandrite of Lydda. Garfeh gave the following account, as recorded by historian Dan Kurzman:
“I am the Archimandrite of Lydda,” he announced. “I hope you have come in peace.”
“If it is the desire of the people of this town to live with us in peace,” Kelman assured him, we shall be very happy.” They may open their shops and resume normal life. Can you arrange for the surrender?”
“I shall try,” the prelate answered … “I shall ask the leaders of the Moslem and Christian communities to meet with us immediately in my apartment upstairs.”
He then instructed an aide to run to the Big Mosque to fetch the Moslem leaders, and sent another to his own church to bring the Christian leaders taking refuge there.
About an hour later, a dozen Arab notables were sitting in Garfeh’s living room sipping coffee and chatting with the clergyman, Kelman, and other Israeli officers. Finally, Kelman, putting down his coffee, addressed them:
“Gentlemen, the city has been conquered, and we want your cooperation. We suggest that you find the citizens who have been operating the utilities so that your people can have water and electricity without delay. But first you must accept our terms for peace: Surrender of all fighting personnel and of all arms within twenty-four hours. If these conditions are not met, we shall have to take action.”
“We agree,” one of the Arabs said with quiet resignation. “May the residents stay here if they wish?”
“Yes, they may,” Kelman replied, “if they live here peacefully.” (Genesis 1948, Dan Kurzman, p. 514)
The very next day, the Jordanians sent a patrol to the outskirts of the town, made up of one tank and two armored cars, the Jordanian patrol ran into trouble, and had to shoot its way out of town. The residents, apparently thinking this was a Jordanian assault to retake the town, began attacking the remaining Israeli soldiers. Five Israeli guards stationed outside the Dahmash Mosque were the first to be killed, and almost immediately the entire town erupted in shooting. (Kurzman, p. 515)
Despite the surrender agreement, and the promise to turn over arms, the Israelis, now numbering only 500 men, had to once again take the town in another desperate battle.
Fighting house-to-house to root out snipers, and this time giving no quarter, within an hour much of the town was once again under control, and an estimated 200 Arabs were dead.
The second battle to take Lydda was over, but now facing the Israelis was the difficult question of what to do with the inhabitants. The town leaders, knowing that they had broken their word to surrender and disarm, and knowing in particular that the five Israeli soldiers outside the mosque had been massacred and their bodies mutilated, feared that the Israelis would now return the favour.
It’s hardly surprising that the Israelis were in no mood to give the residents another chance to break their promise to live in peace. the residents were ordered to evacuate the city and move towards the Jordanian lines and Ramallah. 
Despite this, more than 1,000 Palestinians were allowed to stay 
And as for the “Death March,” out of about 30,000 Palestinians who had to walk about 10–15 miles to the the Legion front, “a handful, and perhaps dozens, died of dehydration and exhaustion.” 
The First Intifada
“He was also the Minister of Defense when the First Intifada, which was characterized by peaceful protests and strikes, was violently crushed. “Within the first two years of the Intifada, almost 30,000 children required medical treatment for injuries caused by beatings from Israeli soldiers. At the same time”, as Al Jazeera noted, “a policy of collective punishment was put in place, in which more than 175,000 Palestinians were arrested and 2,000 homes were demolished.” Collective punishment being a war crime in and of itself.”
Far from being “characterized by peaceful protests and strikes” during the first four years of the uprising, more than 3,600 Molotov cocktail attacks, 100 hand grenade attacks and 600 assaults with guns or explosives were reported by the Israel Defense Forces
Israeli civilians were attacked with rocks, knives, axes, and Molotov cocktails. In one case, “an Israeli mother and her three children burned to death” when “youths hurled five gasoline bombs at a passenger bus near the West Bank town of Jericho and flames engulfed the vehicle.”
On another occasion, fourteen died after a bus was driven into a ravine: “Several of the victims were burned to death, while others were crushed,” reported journalists on the scene, as a rescuer found “something black that just a few minutes ago was a human being.” Over 160 Israelis died in this manner, with 4,000 wounded in the first three years.
Then there were the Palestinian casualties: “the tortured, burnt, hanged, quartered and garroted victims of the Intifada,” in the words of one commentary. These included “a man tied to a post and stabbed to death, an old man axed, a boy of five bloodied… At least 100 of the victims had been beaten to death. Others had been tortured with burning cigarettes, knives and boiling tar, and their limbs and genitals amputated.” Other typical practices were “the beheading of prostitutes in the Nablus casbah, the evisceration of pregnant women, the ‘honor’ killings of straying teenage girls, and the torture-murder of children.” The motivations were often obscure; in general, it was “difficult to tell whether the child victims are beaten, maimed and killed for their own crimes or those of their parents.” 
The respected journalist Steven Emerson reported that the population lived “in daily terror” because:
“hardly a day goes by without a brutal execution of a Palestinian by roving death squads,” representing Fatah, Hamas and other fascist movements: Some common murder techniques are beheading, mutilation, gouging out eyes, cutting off ears or limbs, and pouring molten plastic or acid on a victim’s face. Although the squads refer to their victims as “collaborators” (meaning with Israel), most of them are executed because of political, religious, and personal rivalries or because of suspected drug dealing or prostitution”
Emerson related that over 800 people had died in these atrocities, but later estimates were much higher: a team of Palestinian and Israeli researchers identified 750 death-squad murders in Gaza and concluded that another 1,000 had been slaughtered in the West Bank  More than the number of Palestinians killed by the IDF.
Blaming Israel for “Collective punishment” is baseless when you can not show any official policy and simply ignore the context of the period.
British Mandate Palestine
“Up until 1916, the British had been promising the Arabs independence. The Ottomans were not Arabs, and after 400 years of Ottoman rule, the Arabs were looking forward to finally getting their independence. So when British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration, promising to establish a “Jewish national home” in Palestine, it marked a great betrayal of trust to Palestinians. Many Zionists recognize now, the problems with the British and French borders, but don’t really mention how the Arabs had been seeking independence and how they were betrayed.”
Central to this claim is a letter dated 24 October 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, to King Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, pledging Arab independence. this letter was conditional on a general Arab uprising against the Turks. Predicated on reciprocal action, the letter committed the British to recognize and uphold Arab independence in the areas of the Fertile Crescent once it was liberated by the Arabs themselves. As all evidence shows, few tribes rebelled against the Turks. The Arabs in Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia fought for the Ottoman Empire against the British. In addition to its non-binding nature, McMahon’s letter has been misinterpreted with respect to the territories it covers. archival discovery of the Arabic version actually read by Hussein indisputably shows that Palestine was not included in the British pledge. Indeed, Hussein welcomed the return of the Jews just as his son Emir Feisal believed that Arab-Jewish cooperation would be a means to build Arab independence without the interference of the European powers. 
“The British facilitated mass immigration policies, which were causing a major shift in demographics, alarming the Arab population. The Jewish minority of around 5% quickly grew to 10% by the time of the 1922 census.”
Before the First World War, the Jews were already 15% of the population, the Ottoman policy caused the deportation of thousands of them, caused the reduction of the Jewish population from 85,000 to 56,000 
In a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration approved less than one-third of the quota the Jewish Agency it asked for would be in 1936. 
“There were protests and a couple of riots (in 1920 and 1929)”
A nice way to describe pogroms in which about 200 Jews were brutally murdered, most of them from the old settlement that lived there for centuries.
“leading up to the general strike in 1936, which was a powerful show of Palestinian unity…”
During the rebellion of 1936–1939, when Husseini assassinations of political opponents and anyone suspected of any type of collaboration crested, about 1,000 Arabs were killed by fellow Arabs, about 500 of them in 1938 alone. (By comparison, about 1,100 Arab rebels were killed in 1938 by British, Zionist, and anti-rebel Arab forces.) By 1939, the Husseinis were paying 100 Palestine pounds to operatives for the killing of high-level “traitors” and 25 pounds for lower-level “traitors.” Killers of Jews earned only 10 pounds. Perhaps this partly explains why “only” some 500 Jews were killed in the course of the revolt. 
so long for “Palestinian unity”…
“Following World War II, illegal immigration became the main form of entry into what was still British Mandate Palestine…”
Why? Did they try to escape a genocide or something?
“But historians show that Zionists, led by David Ben Gurion, had been planning the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in “the Red House” in Tel Aviv for over a decade”
In a previous article, I refuted this accusation
“ even though Jews made up only a third of the population, Palestinians were justifiably outraged, yet continued to be excluded from the process. Resolution 181 was even worse than an unfair 56–44% division of territory as it allotted the most fertile land and almost all urban and rural territory in Palestine to the new Jewish state, plus 400 of the over 1000 Palestinian villages their residents lost, with no right of appeal”
These boundaries were based solely on demographics. The borders of the Jewish State were arranged with no consideration of security; hence, the new state’s frontiers were virtually indefensible. Overall, the Jewish State population was to be 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs. Approximately 92,000 Arabs lived in Tiberias, Safed, Haifa, and Bet Shean, and another forty thousand were Bedouins, most of whom were living in the desert. The remainder of the Arab population was spread throughout the Jewish state. The Arab State was to be with a population of 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews 
To the contrary to the claim that Critics claim the UN gave the Jews fertile land while the Arabs were allotted hilly, arid land, approximately 60% of the Jewish state was to be the desert in the Negev, while the Arabs occupied most of the agricultural land 
Further complicating the situation was the UN majority’s insistence that Jerusalem remain apart from both states and be administered as an international zone. This arrangement left more than 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem isolated from their country and circumscribed by the Arab state.
According to British statistics, more than 70% of the land in what would become Israel belonged to the mandatory government. Those lands reverted to Israeli control after the departure of the British. Another 8.6% of the land was owned by Jews, and about 3.3% by Arabs who became citizens of Israel. That means only about 16.9% belonged to Arabs who left the country before and after the Arab invasion of Israel 
“The process began in early December, 1947 with a series of attacks against Palestinian villages and neighborhoods. They were engaged ineffectively from the start on January 9 by units of the first all-Arab volunteer army. It resulted in forced expulsions beginning in mid-February, 1948.”
According to Benny Morris:
“At 8:zo am on 3o November 1947, an eight-man Jaffa-based armed band, led by Seif al-Din Abu Kishk, ambushed a Jewish bus in the Coastal Plain near Kfar Syrkin, killing five and wounding others. Half an hour later the gunmen let loose at a second bus, southbound from Hadera, killing two more. Later that morning, Arab snipers began to fire from Jaffa’s Manshiya neighborhood into southern Tel Aviv, killing at least one person. These were the first dead of the 1948 War. Shots were also fired at Jewish buses in Jerusalem and Haifa.”
Be that as it may, there was also a clear, organized Palestinian Arab response to the UN resolution. Guided by Hussein from Cairo, the AHC on i December declared a three-day general strike in Palestine to begin the following day. On z December a large Arab mob, armed with clubs and knives, burst out of Jerusalem’s Old City and descended on the New Commercial Center at Mamilla Street, attacking Jewish passersby and shops. A number of people were injured, one seriously, and the district was set alight. The mob then proceeded up Queen Mary Street and into Jaffa Street. Haganah intelligence identified two AHC officials, Muhammad Ali Salah and Mahmoud `Umari, as leading the crowd.10 Small Haganah units fired above and into the mob as Mandate police and troops generally looked on. Indeed, several policemen joined in the vandalizing and looting, though others helped evacuate the Jewish wounded.ll The mob eventually turned back and dispersed. But the war had begun.” 
The Arabs themselves were unambiguous in accepting respons’bility for starting the war. Jamal Husseini informed the Security Council on April 16, 1948:
“The representatives of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight.”
“Lifta was harassed by Stern Gang and Irgun militants through December 1947 and January 1948”
Lifta in fact had a reputation as a particularly violent neighborhood, known for its petty crime, murders and sniper attacks on Jews even well before 1948.
Oct 30 1929:
The village served as a base for sniping at the nearby Jewish neighborhoods: Kiryat Moshe, Givat Shaul and Romema
n Dec. 15th, 1947 the Palestine Post reported that Arab fighters from Lifta, possibly members of the irregular forces, attacked the Jewish Romema quarter. On Jan. 19th, 1948, Yisrael Valtuch and Dr. O. Feldmann were wounded by sniper fire from Lifta and shots were also fired at a bus to Jerusalem. On Jan. 10, shots were fired from Lifta at Jews. On Jan. 20, Arab snipers in a house on the edge of Lifta fired at Jews. The Haganah went to the house and blew it up. According to the Palestine Post, Lifta residents claimed the attacks emanated from the Arab fighters who had infiltrated their village. On Jan. 30, the Palestine Post reported that five houses in Lifta were blown up by members of the Lehi. The Lehi had observed the houses being used by Arab fighters who had infiltrated the village and the Jewish fighters feared that the village would become a base of operations.
“By the time the entire village was occupied, most of the people had already left”
Some families had already left the village after a decision had been made somewhat earlier on 4 December, to evacuate its women and children, in order to host a military company, and on 4 December 1947 some Arab families left
“ Other sources say that Jewish loudspeakers could be heard in the city ordering Arab residents to leave “before it’s too late”
Israeli historian Benny Morris, and even radical left historian Illan Pappe, who acknowledged — in his book ‘The Israel Palestine Question‘ — that “Jewish troops had no clear intention of provoking an Arab exodus” and that “their military strategy was not calculated to produce such an outcome”.
Simply failed to mention that about 170 Jews had been killed by snipers from Jaffa during December 1947 — April 1948
“In 1948, Deir Yassin was a prosperous, expanding Arab village near Jerusalem, at relative peace with its Jewish neighbors with whom much business was done.”
- Deir Yassin participated in arms trafficking in the 1920s during the violent Arab riots of the 1920s”
- “Deir Yassin residents had carried out violent attacks on the Jews of Givat Shaul in October 1928”
- “During the August 1929 Arab riots throughout Palestine, the villagers of Deir Yassin had again assaulted their Jewish neighbors in Givat Shaul as well as Jews in the Beit Hakerem neighborhood and the Montefiore Quarter”
- …”we continually faced attempted forays into our homes from Deir Yassin. We dug out our ‘illegal’ weapons every night and waited, while the Jewish supplementary police repulsed the infiltrators again and again. Months later, we had a defense position in nearby Motza [and the commander] often asked my help to transport men to their night duties in Motza. Driving back and forth to Motza from Jerusalem, I spent many hours lying in roadside ditches after ambushes out of Deir Yassin.” 
“the villagers of Deir Yassin and those of the nearby Jewish village of Giv’at Shaul signed a pact, later approved at Haganah headquarters, to maintain their good relations”
A peace agreement that is honored for only some of the time is not worth having; it is worse than no agreement at all since it exposes the opposing side to greater potential harm as they lower their guard. Deir Yassin, at best, only partially adhered to this peace agreement while its belligerent violations rendered meaningless so much as a reference to it.
- Haganah driver Arnold Shper testified in a 1952 judicial proceeding that during his posting in Givat Shaul in February and March 1948, he spoke with Haganah intelligence agents who mentioned “that foreign Arabs had been detected in Deir Yassin, [including] Iraqis.” 7
- Jerusalem Haganah intelligence officer Mordechai Gihon led two reconnaissance sorties into Ein Kerem, adjacent to Deir Yassin, and returned with documents revealing regular contacts between Deir Yassin and the bases of Syrian and Iraqi volunteer soldiers in Ein Kerem. On March 30, Gihon reported to his superiors that “150 men, mostly Iraqis, entered Deir Yassin.” 8
- On Saturday night Jerusalem’s western neighborhoods Beit Hakerem and Bayit Vagan were attacked for the first time. The attack came from Deir Yassin and Ein Kerem and also from Colonia. The defenders returned fire; the shots continued the whole [night].9
- On Sunday, April 4, commander Shaltiel received an urgent message from the intelligence officer of the Haganah’s Etzioni division: “There’s a gathering in Deir Yassin. Armed men left [from Deir Yassin] in the direction of [the nearby town of] lower Motza, northwest of Givat Shaul. They are shooting at passing cars.” 10
- That same day, the deputy commander of the Haganah’s Beit Horon brigade, Michael Hapt reported to Shaltiel: “A [Jewish] passenger car from Motza was attacked near the flour mill, below Deir Yassin, and is stopped there. There is rifle fire upon it. You too send an armoured vehicle with weapons. There is concern that the road is cut off.” 11
- An armoured vehicle carrying Lehi fighters was also attacked at the same spot that day. A Haganah intelligence officer who described the incident to his superiors reported that according to Lehi officer David Gottlieb, those of his men who disembarked from their vehicle to return fire said that the attackers appeared to be Arab soldiers rather than local villagers.12
- Shortly before the battle of Deir Yassin, there was additional troubling news: Mordechai Gihon’s lookouts reported that numerous armed men were moving between Ein Kerem and Deir Yassin. Some of the soldiers were wearing Iraqi uniforms, and while many of them had entered Deir Yassin, only a few had returned to Ein Kerem.13
- And just hours before the IZL-Lehi action against Deir Yassin began, Shaltiel cabled his colleague Shimon Avidan: “The Arabs in Deir Yassin have trained a mortar on the highway in order to shell the convoy [bringing supplies to besieged Jewish portions of Jerusalem].”14
The Jews were able to get their accurate intelligence from a contact on the inside. “Some of the Haganah’s information about developments in Deir Yassin was coming directly from inside the village itself. A Haganah agent code-named ‘Ovadia,’ working in the Jerusalem area for the Haganah’s Arabic Department, met regularly with Deir Yassin residents as well as their mukhtar, or village chief, who was a paid Haganah informant.”
Sharif Kan’ana of Bir Zeit University interviewed survivors and published figures in 1988; 107 villagers had died, 11 of them armed, with 12 wounded Israeli researcher Eliezer Tauber writes that a total of 101 people were killed, 61 definitely in combat circumstances (including 24 armed fighters, with the remained being their family members who were with them); 18 for whom the cause of death could not be determined; about 10 whose deaths are in a “grey zone” whose charactization can be debated; and a further 11 being members of a single family who were gunned down by a single Irgun member. 
After Israeli Statehood
“Throughout 1949, and beginning a precedent continuing to this day, about 8,000 refugees were put in prison camps while many others escaping cleansing were physically abused and harassed under Israeli military rule”
On average, most spent less than a year in the camps, which were largely emptied by 1950. the prisoners of war were held in internationally recognized camps under Red Cross supervision, and in accordance with all practices and rules set by the Geneva Convention. The allegations of “torture,” come not from the Red Cross’s reports but from oral testimonies that Abu Sitta and his co-author, Terry Rempel, gathered from internees many decades after the fact.
The Six Day War
Already refuted the main points in this article
The Yom Kippur War/The 1973 Arab-Israeli War/The Ramadan War
Here he just jumps from one anecdote to another,
Claims that Israel controls everything that goes in or out of Gaza
Ignores the fact that Gaza has a border with Egypt and the mouths of international law, the sea blockade on Gaza is legal
Completely distorts the reality with the clash in Gaza in May 2021
Repeats the “disproportionately” argument, Nazi Germany lost 1,500,000
to 3,000,000 Civilians in World War II, USA 12,000. So? The number of losses does not indicate the content of the conflict
Introducing The Great March of Return was a “non-violent protest”
Needless to say, most of the dead were identified as members of terrorist organizations
Relying on Eran Efrati as if he is worth something
again Jacob’s clip as if it represents the whole story of East Jerusalem
Ignores the riots just to present Israel as if it arrests random Arabs for the sake of it.
“A Pew study in Israel from a couple of years ago finds that 48% of Jewish Israelis believe that Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel, 79% of Israelis believe Jews should get preferential treatment over Arab citizens”
This response was affected by how the question was asked. That poll did not say ALL Arabs and it did not clarify WHICH Arabs it was talking about (i.e did this refer to terrorists (who are sometimes expelled) or to all Israeli Arabs). It also did not define which type of transfer it meant (i.e was it talking about expelling people or was it talking about the proposal to redraw Israel’s borders in a peace deal as part of land swaps so as to include Arab majority areas in Israel in the Palestinian state and Jewish majority areas in the West Bank in Israel — the later part of which swap no one has any problem with.). It was widely criticized for its vague wording — see
NY Times Misrepresents Pew Poll on 'Expulsion'
If a newspaper fails when it comes to journalism's most obviously ethical tenet - accuracy - it's not surprising that…
This poll is so old that anyone citing it should be aware of this.
In THIS survey (worded more specifically) the percentage of Israeli Jews agreeing that Arabs have the right to live as a minority enjoying full civil rights was 73.8% in 2017.
Now compare (in the same survey) only 58% of Israeli Arabs recognize Israel’s right to exist (AT ALL, not as a ‘Jewish and Democratic state’ — only 49% recognize that or as a Zionist state — only 36% recognize that or EVEN as a Jewish majority state — only 44% recognize that)
Also compare to the fact that 63% of Palestinians reject the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the state of Palestine as citizens or residents
In fact, more Palestinians want to deport Jews than the other way around
“Hamas’ rockets do not have modern targeting systems, so it’s unlikely that they are accurately targeting anyone.”
That this is exactly what makes it indiscriminate shooting, that it is considered a war crime under international law for the obvious reason that it is intentionally endangering civilians.
And yes, Hamas does uses a human shield
His whole argument is based on the “asymmetries” between the IDF and Hamas, does that same argument apply to the coalition forces against ISIS?
The idea that Palestinians have a “right to armed resistance” and therefore Hamas can fire missiles indiscriminately at Israel is unfounded and contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1566
Someone Should Tell Hamas -- And The UN -- That There Is No Legal Right To Destroy Israel "By All…
In its new General Principles and Policies, Hamas proclaims: Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a…
Not to mention that Hamas is an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization founded in 1928, before Israel) that called for the murder of Jews in its official charter for decades.
Which completely negates the basis that its “resistance” is legitimate.
And this is about the end of his attempts to bring new facts.
He just imagines scenes of “what if …”, makes a projection, or just throws assumptions that it is already so pointless to address them.
 Myths and Historiography of the 1948 Palestine War Revisited: The Case of Lydda by Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela
 What Happened at Lydda
 The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited Morris 2004, p. 455
Morris 2003, p. 177
Jewish western bulletin, June 20, 1991, page 5
 Yosif Mahmoud Haj-Yahia, Edy Kaufman and Sufian Abu Nijaila, Alleged Palestinian Collaborators With Israel and Their Families, Peace Papers, №12, Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Summer 1999, 18–9.
 Palestine: A Twice-Promised Land? By Isaiah Friedman
 The Jewish Experience of the First World War by Edward Madigan, Gideon Reuveni p. 112
Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172; Howard Sachar, A History Of Israel, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 53.
 Army of Shadows, Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948 by Hillel Cohen p. 172–174
 Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 292.
 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), 238
Moshe Aumann, “Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880–1948” (Academic Committee on the Middle East: Israel, 1974), 18
1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War by Benny Morris
 Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917–1929, Second Edition, 1991, pg. 69.
Yitshaq Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory (New York: Shengold, 1983), p.439.
 Deir Yassin: The End of the Myth by Eliezer Tauber